Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq, was initially established as Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al Jihad, “Unity and Jihad Group,” in April 2004 by long-time Jordanian jihadist Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. Using such tactics as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), suicide bombers, and executions of hostages by beheading and other means, the group targeted Coalition forces and attempted to pressure countries and foreign companies to leave Iraq, push Iraqis to stop supporting the United States and the Iraqi Government, and attract additional cadre to its ranks.

In a 17 October 2004 statement, al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Usama Bin Ladin and renamed the group Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (“The Base Organization of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers,” a common reference for Iraq). As part of its plan to spread jihad into “Greater Syria”—that is, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan—and establish an Islamic state there, AQI expanded its targeting outside of Iraq in August 2005 by attempting a rocket attack on a US Navy ship in the Port of Aqaba, Jordan, and in November 2005 with the bombing of three hotels in Amman that left 67 dead and more than 150 injured. In an attempt to unify Sunni jihadists in Iraq, in January 2006 AQI created the Mujahidin Shura Council, an umbrella organization that five other small jihadist groups joined. Al-Zarqawi made it a priority to foster sectarian violence between the Shia and Sunni in Iraq to incite civil war, primarily through the targeting of Shia civilians.

Al-Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike on 7 June 2006. The new leader of AQI, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, announced in October 2006 the formation of the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI), led by Iraqi national Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, in an attempt to politicize AQI’s terrorist activities and place an “Iraqi face” on their efforts. AQI’s continued targeting of Iraqi civilians caused a backlash against the organization, primarily from Sunni tribal and local community leaders. The growth of local anti-AQI groups along with Coalition and Iraqi operations denied AQI traditional safehavens, restricting the organization’s freedom of movement and resulting in a decreased attack tempo. However, AQI is still capable of conducting destabilizing operations and remains the most active and capable of the Sunni extremist groups in Iraq. Recent propaganda statements by AQI’s leaders and an uptick in high-profile attacks in mid-2009 represent an attempt by the group to demonstrate its continued relevance in the wake of the Coalition withdrawal from Iraqi cities and efforts to posture itself to take advantage of the changing security environment.